POS activation cards, e.g., those exemplified but hardly limited to those described/shown in U.S. Pat. No. 7,537,168 (Anderson et al.), are well known and popular mechanisms by which to “claim” a gift, promotion or premium. Various merchant cards (e.g., stored value cards) are commonly displayed in kiosks or the like for purchase and activation at retailers such as Target, Walgreens, CVS, etc. Notionally, in this setting, a purchaser will select a merchant card of designated nominal cash amount, or one capable of designating a purchaser select amount, and will thereafter proceed to “pay” at checkout, with the retailer “activating” the gift/premium which is later used, commonly by a third party who is more often than not a gift recipient of the activated card.
An alternate context for such cards is in connection to “access.” For example and without limitation, subsequent to a card holder revealing a revealable “key,” in the form of a revealable information (i.e., a “hidden” code such as an alpha/numeric stringer of the information field), the information/code may be used by the card holder to redeem or access a loyalty reward, premium, membership, subscription service, etc., or to access software or the like.
Skimming is a criminal activity whereby the access key of the POS activation card is obtained in advance of consumer purchase at the POS. The premium is quickly redeemed, not by the purchaser, but by the “skimmer” or their co-conspirators.
Two general approaches to POS activation fraud prevention are noted, namely, transactional steps to prevent or defeat activation fraud, and POS card adaptations towards that end. The instant disclosure is generally directed to the later approach.
Heretofore, prepaid card carriers and the like have been subject to numerous adaptations, ranging from photocopying prevention (see e.g., EP 2,226,267 (Abel)) to the inclusion of embedded microprocessors for biometric assessment and the like (see e.g., US Pub. No. 2007/0073619 (Smith)). Moreover, tamper evident cards characterized by thin panel package lamina or the like are generally known (see e.g., US Pub. No. 2012/0273576 (Tomczyk et al.) & U.S. Pat. No. 8,931,639 (Payne)). Further still, transaction cards characterized by security labels (i.e., a data field obstruction layer in the form of a hot stamped foil label) are also known (see e.g., U.S. Pat. Nos. 8,720,786 & 9,053,470 (Boge et al.)).
It is contemplated and believed advantageous and desirable to adapt known POS activation cards such that any operations executed upon the card (i.e., manipulation) in an effort to obtain the revealable, premium redemption data will corrupt the card, namely, the adaptation will operatively link or unite the information field of the revealable information to/with machine readable content, e.g., a bar code, magstripe, etc., in such a way that attempts to reveal the revealable information will corrupt the transaction means and thusly render it inoperable. Codes are protected, unauthorized code use eliminated and activation disabled when codes are accessed.
Via contemplated adaptations, the consumer and merchant cannot complete a sale/transaction with regard to a POS activation card of suspect integrity. Thus, while the card is essentially ready for the recycle bin, there has been no financial loss for either or both of the purchaser or/and the merchant.